

**LOWELL DECL. EX. 22c**

**The Allocation of Prohibited Arms from PA Offices to its Forces**

The document captured by the IDF in the offices of the Financial Directorate in the Mukata'a in Ramallah is handwritten on paper of the PA - The General Security Financial Directorate of the Northern Districts ("The West Bank"). The following is a translation of the document:

Date: 18 November 2001

I, Mukadem (Lt. Colonel) Abd Al-Latif Abd Al Rahim have received the following items from the Financial Directorate:

R.B.G.-7 bombs - 20 only.

B-7 launcher propellant charge - 7 only.

And thus I am the undersigned - Mukadem Abd Al Latif Naji.

**Notes:**

1. Mukadem (Lt. Colonel) Abd AL Latif Naji is the person responsible for money and administration in the office of Haj Ismail Tsarzur, the head of the National Security Apparatus in the West Bank. This Lt. Colonel is also responsible for the arms of the National Security Apparatus.
2. The intention is to rockets and propellant charges for RPG-7 anti-tank launchers.

**PA Efforts to Obtain Arms Prohibited by International Agreements**

The following table lists the types and quantities of arms carried aboard ships during 2001/02 whose cargoes were destined for PA elements, as well as additional attempts of PA elements - official elements or elements financed and supported by the PA - to obtain arms banned according to international agreements. The table does not list all the arms captured aboard these ships, but only specific types - anti-tanks weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, mortars and artillery rockets (Katyushas).

	<i>Santorini</i>	<i>Karine-A</i>	<b>Additional Attempts</b>
RPG-7 anti-tank launcher	20	51	Amassed by official PA elements in Ramallah
Mortars (60, 81, 120 mm)	2	39	Mortars produced by PA elements in the Gaza Strip
Single barrel rocket launchers (107, 122 mm)	-	10	The "Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades" are trying to produce rockets similar to the QASSAM
Bombs for anti-tank launchers	150	328	
Mortar bombs	98	1545	
Artillery rockets	50	345	

**Anti-Tank Weapon Systems Banned by International Agreements which were Captured in the Mukata'a Compound in Ramallah**



**30 Units of PG-7 Anti-Tank Rocket**



**5 Units of PG-7M Anti-Tank Rocket**



**8 Units of OG-7 Anti-Personnel Rocket**

**Chapter VI - Cooperation Between the PA and Terror-Sponsoring States**

1. The PA holds contacts with the "axis of evil" states - Iran and Iraq, as well as with Saudi Arabia. The accumulating information, based, inter alia, on captured documents, indicates that the PA receives money, arms and moral support from these states.

**The Ties with Iran**

2. The major role which the PA and its apparatuses played in the armed struggle against Israel brought about a change in Iran's attitude towards it. If until the Intifada, Iran viewed the PA as a "traitor" which seeks a political settlement with Israel, following the latest confrontation, the Palestinian apparatuses are considered by Tehran as the leaders of the violent struggle. On this background, the Iranian leader published (Al Mastakabal, September 2000), a religious decree permitting cooperation with the PA and Fatah. In our assessment, in the future the Iranian policy towards the PA will depend on its policies and activities towards Israel, and the PA's return to the political track will lead to the severing of the ties established with Iran during the past year.

3. The improved relations was prominently reflected in the cooperation during the Karine-A affair, which constituted only one expression of the continuing Iranian effort, which was significantly enhanced since the outbreak of the



Intifada - to smuggle arms and force multipliers into the PA areas. This in order to create a "Lebanonization" of the conflict; escalate the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians and disrupt any attempt to calm the situation and stabilize a cease fire. All this, in the framework of Iran's call to implement the "Lebanese model" in the PA as an essential stage on the path to Israel's destruction, in the more distant future.

4. On this background, Iran expresses persistent and declared support for suicide attacks (in an interview to Der Spiegel on 24 September 2001, Foreign Minister Kharazi stated that the suicide attack in the Dolphinarium disco in Tel Aviv was not an act of terror since Israel is an "occupying power". Ayatollah Atma Fadal Lankarani - a senior cleric in the Shi'ite world who resides in Qom and is identified with the conservative camp, also published a religious decree on 7 January according to which since the Palestinians have no other choice than to endanger their lives in suicide attacks in order to defend their state, such activities are permitted.

5. The bottom line - Iran draws much encouragement from the PA's turn to the route of terror (according to its method "legitimate resistance") and perceives the situation as an historical "window of opportunities" to achieve its ideological goals (the destruction of Israel, which the Iranian regime continues to espouse) and its strategic goals (Israel's weakening and containment in the framework of Iran's attempts for regional hegemony). Since September 11 2001, the escalation in the conflict serves Iran in an additional aspect, as reflected in the words of Majlis member and Presidential advisor, Mohtashemi Pur (23 April 2002), who claimed that the US will not attack Iran and Iraq as long as the Palestinian crisis continues; and therefore Iran must "increase the strength" of the Palestinians and "prevent Israel from any possibility of solving the crisis in the Middle East".

### The Ties with Iraq

#### Stronger Iraqi-PA Ties

6. Since the end of 2001, Iraqi-PA ties have expanded. The convergence of their interests generates practical cooperation in both the political and the military realms. The equation appears to be comprised of terrorism, arms and oil.

7. Iraq has a distinct interest in causing an escalation in the Israel-PA confrontation, therefore it rides the latest wave of suicide attacks in Israel. The escalation in the situation serves the Iraqi interest: it draws the attention from the Gulf to the PA, turns the Arab World against Israel and postpones the US-initiated campaign against Iraq.

8. The Iraqis draw a simple equation, and this is how their actions in the present crisis should be viewed: on one side the US and "the Zionist Entity", vs. Iraq and Palestine on the other side.

9. Palestinian speakers describe this similarly:

*"The Palestinian conflict and the Palestinians' steadfastness will affect - if not all of the US' plans - at least those plans directed against Iraq, or at least their timing. This provides us with a safety margin that enables consolidating a more determined Arab stance for protecting Palestine and Iraq". Nabil Sha'ath (15 March 2002).*

10. The Iraqis have done and still do all they can to disrupt the US effort to stabilize the situation in the PA. The Middle East visits made by Vice President Cheney and General Zinni were called by the Iraqis in March 2002 as *"vicious and failing tours having one goal - to deal Iraq and the Palestinian Intifada a blow... These are two facets of one American aggressive action".* According to the Iraqis, Gen. Zinni was sent to the Middle East *"in a false trick by which*

*President Bush wishes to present the US as one interested in reducing the Zionist violence against the Palestinian people... in a miserable attempt to moderate the Arab stance which is growing extreme against the US" (these descriptions were included in an analytical article in the Al Jamhuriyah newspaper, 13 March 2002).*

### **Encouraging the Suicide Attacks**

11. In recent months, Saddam Hussein has openly praised the suicide terrorists. In 3 consecutive statements - in an Iraqi cabinet meeting (January 2002, cited on Iraqi Television), in meetings he held with chiefs of tribes (December 2001) and clergymen (March 2002) - he praised the suicide actions, including the suicide attack in Jerusalem carried out by Waffa Idris, a 16 year old Palestinian girl. Saddam declared his intention to build a memorial in her name. According to Saddam, these attacks protect the principles of the Arab Nation and the Palestinian People.

12. At the end of the visit in Iraq of Faruq Qadumi, Head of the PLO Political Bureau, (March 2001), it was announced by Tareq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, that Saddam Hussein decided to raise the grant given to Intifada 'victims' to \$25,000 (instead of the earlier \$10,000).

13. The sum to be donated to the family of a killed Palestinian by the Iraqi aid is comparable to an average salary in the PA for 5 years.

14. *To the list of Saddam Hussein's actions and statements in the last decade should be added the fact that he is one of the few Arab leaders to publicly justify the most horrific terrorist attacks, directed against innocent civilians.*

15. In addition to the direct support of the PA, Iraq encourages terrorism by operating pro-Iraqi terrorist organizations in the West Bank. To this end, Baghdad has revived in the last two years the PLF/Abu-Al-Abbas organization in the PA areas - it recruited and trained Al Abbas activists in camps in Iraq, equipped them with arms and sent them to carry out terrorist attacks in Haifa (April 2001) and the West Bank together with Hamas activists (July 2001). The arms smuggling and attempts to infiltrate activists are apparently carried out from Jordanian territory. The PLF/Abu-Al-Abbas is the organization which carried out the terrorist attack on the Achille Lauro passenger ship, in which a US citizen was murdered.

16. The Iraqis openly seek to encourage the waves of terror against Israel, and especially suicide attacks. As long as Arafat does not operate to stop this terrorism he plays into the hands of the Iraqi game.

### **Arms for the Palestinians**

17. Since the beginning of 2001, the Iraqis openly encourage arms transfers to the PA. The Iraqi proposal to the Arab League conference in Cairo (2 April 2002) included an explicit paragraph concerning "support of the Palestinian Intifada with all types of arms, primarily antitank weapons through Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon". This proposition continues Saddam Hussein's words (Iraqi News Agency, January 2001) that had the Palestinians had antitank weapons, they would have succeeded to destroy the Israeli armor and prevent it from reaching the Palestinian towns. "If the Arabs had wanted - and that is simple - it would have required only turning a blind eye to the arrival of such weapons".

18. *Since January 2001, the Iraqi President has publicly emphasized the Palestinians' right to procure arms and the duty of Arab states to assist them in this effort. This implies that Iraq openly calls for the violation of the international agreements which the PA signed - agreements forbidding the procurement of antitank arms. (Recently captured documents clearly indicate that the PA procured RPG-7 antitank rocket launchers, forbidden by the international*



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 agreements which the PA had signed).

### Iraqi Oil Finances the Terrorist Activity

19. Iraq is acting diligently to undermine the international sanctions regime imposed on it. In its efforts to export oil outside the international inspection envelope it operates vis-a-vis neighboring states and other Middle East elements.

20. At the same time, Iraq views the oil weapon as a means to aid the Palestinians. Saddam Hussein's declaration is a public expression of this approach. However, we can assume that funds accumulated from oil smuggling in recent years enable the Iraqis to aid the Palestinians with money, smuggled weapons and encouragement of suicide bombers.

21. *Iraq is indeed a state supporting terrorism, and Iraqi oil finances this support.*

### Iraqi Financial Aid to the Palestinians

22. The Ba'ath Party representative (the ruling party in Iraq, has branches in the PA areas) publicly expressed a month ago ("Al Quds", 6 March 2002) the deepening Iraqi support of the PA. According to him, Iraq has transferred to the PA a sum of \$12 million as aid.

23. The PA views the Iraqi channel as an important economic support. PA representatives (including Azam Al Ahmed, who is in charge of liaison with Iraq) visited Iraq on numerous occasions in the last two years, in order to obtain financial aid. This aid is given to the families of Palestinians killed and wounded in the Intifada.

24. Ads thanking Saddam Hussein for this support appear in the Palestinian press, and serve the Iraqi propaganda machine, which encourages terrorism and endeavors to inflame the PA.

### Palestinian Ads Praising Iraqi Support

The family of the Shahid Imad Adib Badr Aldaya expresses gratitude and appreciation to the Chairman Yasser Arafat and President Saddam Hussein, for their respectable stance concerning our Shahid and those wounded in the defense of Al Aqsa ("Al Hayat al Jadidah", December 2000)



The relatives of the Shahids Amjad Hussein and Fadi Sabaya express gratitude and appreciation to the Iraqi President and his great people. Jenin - relatives of the Shahids express their utmost gratitude and congratulations to the Mujahed, warrior leader, the President of Iraq Saddam Hussein, may God keep him safe. (Al Quds, January 2001)



**Much gratitude and appreciation to the honorable President Saddam Hussein and members of Arab Liberation Front.**

The father of the Shahid, his brothers and sisters, the Abu Farhah family and his relatives and uncles on the mother and father side, grandfather and mother on behalf of the entire Palestinian



people express their deep gratitude to the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, may God keep him safe, the symbol of nationalism, patriotism and Arab determination, for the honest condolences he offered to our Shahid Palestine Muhammad Raab Qassem Abu Talab and the families of all Shahids, as well as his great help in Palestine. Gratitude to our Iraqi brothers, who give blood and money for the victory of the Palestinian people, the freedom and independence and liberation of Palestine. We also express to our friends in the Arab Liberation Front, Jenin Area much gratitude for their participation and national determination, the condolences they offered, material and moral support. *Together, until the liberation of the holy Jerusalem with the help of Allah.*

#### **The Ties with Saudi Arabia**

26. During Operation Defensive Shield, documents were captured that indicate *direct and systematic Saudi financial support of the families of Palestinian terrorists*, including the families of suicide terrorists who carried out lethal attacks inside Israel. In addition, documents were found that show direct Saudi aid to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas, two organizations that have been declared terror organizations by the US.

27. One of the documents captured is a table found in the "Tulkarm Charity Association", detailing the 10th payments cycle to "casualties of Intifada Al Quds" in the West Bank (in total, the payment cycle consisted of 2,040,000 Saudi Riyal, approx. \$545,000). The table lists payments made to 102 families of terrorists who died during 2001, each family receiving 20,000 Riyal (approx. \$5340). According to the table, the funds were transferred to the families through the Arab Bank. They were handed over to beneficiaries whose names and ID numbers are mentioned in the table.

28. The implication of this document is that a suicide terrorist embarking on a terrorist attack knows that his family will receive continuous aid from the Saudi regime after his death, by means of the Saudi committee for support of the Intifada.

29. It is of note that the Saudi aid does not only include the support of terrorist families. According to additional captured documents (Palestinian intelligence apparatus reports), the Saudis transferred *direct aid to extremist Islamic organizations* (Hamas and PIJ).

#### **Chapter VII - Corruption in the PA**

According to accumulating information, corruption is rampant in the PA's power centers. Below are a number of examples:

- a. Administrative irregularities (the Deputy Chairman of the Palestinian legislative council) detailed the PA's shortcomings: "Key officials in the



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PA suffer from a lack of reliability and talent, many unneeded without need, the appointment of family relations, waste, a policy of monopolies, corruption, the stealing of equipment and money and the phenomenon of "hidden unemployment".

Sa'eb Arekat "As the raiser of budgets from states contributing to the infrastructure development of the local authorities, I am trying to create total transparency between the donor state and the project taking place, by a direct connection between it and the contractor, without middlemen who put their hands in the money being used".

- b. The management of the Palestinian economy by monopolies in order to accumulate financial resources outside the official framework and reward PA senior officials and their families (on the eve of the confrontation, the scope of revenues from the monopolies was estimated to be approx. \$300 million, with the business company of Muhammad Rashid, Arafat's economic advisor, controls the major monopolies including cement, fuel, the casino, the flour mill in Gaza and economic projects in the tourist and industrial realms.
- c. An unjust distribution of aid funds between the different strata of the population. While the Palestinian population suffers from economic predicament, senior PA officials enjoy a high standard of living. Abu Ala completed the construction of a villa in Jericho at a cost of \$1.5 million. The villa's appearance is ostentatious and stimulated sharp criticism from the local population. Arafat distributes funds to PA senior officials for personal needs, including \$50,000 for the wedding of the daughter of "minister" Nabil Amar, the doubling of the living expenses of the son of "minister" Nabil Sha'ath who is studying in France and \$100,000 for the deputy in charge of the information portfolio for construction of a home. Residents from Deir El Balah whose homes were destroyed did not receive the Arafat grant of \$2,000 promised to them 4 months ago; Arafat's grant of \$600 to the unemployed financed by salaries from PA employees was distributed by the Ministry of Labor to cronies who are not unemployed.
- d. Salary delays and theft - the payment of salaries to the public sector according to the low exchange rate of the dollar: The salaries of January 2002 were paid according to an exchange rate of 3.7 shekels to the dollar; A Gaza resident: "PA elements demanded \$2,000 from me, in order for my daughter who works as a doctor in the European hospital in Khan Yunis will receive her salary in an organized manner, the security apparatuses in the Karni crossing pay carriers working on the Israel side of the border salaries according to rates in the PA territories, while the salaries of the carriers received from Israeli manpower companies, which are calculated according to salary rates in Israel, find their way to their pockets.
- e. The levying of taxes and special payments on the population in order to gain profits and supplement income. The money taken for medical treatment in the Sheikh Zayyad hospital in Ramallah is transferred to the pockets of senior PA officials, including the Province Governor; the Palestinian Ministry of Transportation issues licenses for short periods in order to profit from renewal of licenses; the police in Hebron collect from vegetable stall owners sums of money in return for continuing their trade "No one who earns \$800 will be hurt by \$50".
- f. Utilization of humanitarian aid received from abroad for profits (the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture granted Beduin cattle owners from Ramallah money vouchers, a donation from a European country in order to purchase barley. The ministry concluded with a barley salesman a price of \$800 per ton instead of \$600, with the difference



pocketed by senior officials in the Ministry of Agriculture; Tanzim elements from Bethlehem forcefully seized food distributed by UNRWA and decided by themselves who would receive the aid.

- g. Forceful contributions and false arrest of businessmen by the PA security forces and their release in exchange for money and bribes. A senior businessman from Tulkarm was forced to pay \$100,000 for the release of his brother who was arrested by the security apparatuses for collaboration with Israel. A Christian businessman paid \$5,000 for the release of his brother arrested by counter-intelligence apparatus personnel.
- h. The non-payment to PA suppliers. A gas station owner in Jericho stated that the security apparatuses are systematically not paying him for fuel and when they were not permitted to fill up, they began to make threats.
- i. The expropriation of lands arbitrarily. PA elements seized lands of the Orthodox Church in the Bethlehem area while using violence, forged documents and bribes. On some occasions, there was cooperation between church officials and the PA.
- j. Subversion of justice by bribery of and threats to the lives of judges. A senior Tanzim activist who was involved in the rape and murder of a young woman from Bethlehem was set free after the judge was bribed.

## Appendix

### (Partial) Characteristics of the Terrorist Infrastructure which developed in the PA

#### Jenin - The Capital of the Palestinian Suicide Terrorists

1. In Jenin, and especially in the refugee camp in its outskirts, an extensive infrastructure of various terrorist organizations existed prior to the IDF Defensive Wall Operation. These organizations cooperated in "exporting" killing and suicide attacks to Israel. An expression of this can be found in the following excerpt from an internal Fatah document:

2. "(Jenin refugee camp) is characterized by an exceptional presence of fighting men who take the initiative (on behalf of) the national activity. Nothing will beat them and nothing worries them. Therefore, they are ready for self-sacrifice with all the means. And therefore, it is not strange, that Jenin (has been termed) the suiciders capital" (A'simat Al-Istashidin, in Arabic). (From a report of the Fatah movement in Jenin refugee camp addressed to Marwan Barghouti, 25 September 2001)

3. Jenin, "the suiciders capital" "exported during the violent confrontation 28 suicide attacks (most were implemented and some were foiled), and many more terrorist attacks. This terrorism, perpetrated by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah and Hamas, resulted in the death of many dozens of Israelis and the wounding of hundreds.

4. Previous to the IDF Defensive Shield Operation, terror infrastructures of various organizations were concentrated in Jenin, mainly in its refugee camp. Below are general characteristics of the infrastructures of the three leading terrorist organizations:

- a. Hamas - In Jenin and the surrounding villages, a Hamas network operated which was responsible for the perpetration of a number of lethal suicide attacks inside Israel (the most recent in Haifa on 31

March 2002 in which 15 Israelis were killed). The Jenin network operated in cooperation with many and diverse operational elements in the Hamas movement, as well as with the leadership abroad. This network was severely damaged following IDF activity in Tubas (on 5 April) in which 6 major operational activists from the Hamas were killed, including Qis Adwan (head of the Hamas infrastructure in Jenin who directed suicide attacks in Israel in which dozens of Israelis were killed, and Sa'ed Awad (head of the QASSAM-2 rocket project in Samaria, whose death impaired the rocket production infrastructure in Samaria). At the same time, additional senior activists such as Nasser Jerar (involved in the planning of spectacular attacks in Israel and the West Bank) and Jamal Abu Al Hija (head of Hamas in Jenin who directs terror activities and is involved in the transfer of money for financing such activities), are still at large and are active.

- b. PIJ - Until the IDF operation, the PIJ infrastructure in Jenin was the strongest in the PA territories, mostly due to the massive financial aid it received for its activities from the PIJ leadership in Syria (according to captured documents). The PIJ infrastructure suffered a severe blow with the death of the head of the military infrastructure in Jenin, Mahmud Tu'albe (involved in the perpetration of terrorist attacks, including inside Israel), and the arrest of senior operational activists. Amongst the senior activists arrested, the most prominent are Ali Safuri (involved in the direction of a large number of terrorist attacks, including suicide and killing attacks inside Israel) and Thabet Mardawi (directed a large number of terrorist attacks, including suicide and killing attacks inside Israel).
- c. Fatah/Al Aqsa Brigades/Tanzim - The Fatah network in Jenin (with all its names) served as a central terror focus. Local Fatah activists who according to captured documents were in close contact with Marwan Barghouti, perpetrated many shooting and explosive charges attacks in the West Bank and inside Israel, against the IDF and Israeli civilians. The last of these attacks was the suicide attack in a coffee shop in Tel Aviv on 30 March 2002 (one Israeli civilian killed and 45 wounded). Amongst the senior Fatah activists, the most notable are Jamal Hawil (responsible for direction of lethal terrorist attacks, arrested by the IDF) and Ita Abu Ramila (Fatah and Preventive Security Apparatus activist in Jenin).

5. Expressions of the scope and power of the terror infrastructures in the Jenin refugee camp, in Jenin and in the nearby villages (Qabatiyah and Tubas for example) can be found during Operation Defensive Wall: The intense fighting in the refugee camps which exacted a heavy price from the IDF, the large quantities of arms and explosives laboratories captured (see Appendix A) and the high number of senior and junior terrorist activists arrested or killed - all these are evidence of the depth of the terror infrastructure in the Jenin region.



**Explosives Laboratory  
found in Jenin**

6. During the fighting, a large number of gunmen in small squads operated in the Jenin refugee camp from inside civilian buildings. Unlike in other towns, senior PIJ activists remained in the camp, stubbornly fighting against the IDF. The instructions they received were clear: There must be no surrender and you must spill as much as blood as possible from the IDF soldiers. Contrary to the Palestinian claims of a massacre ostensibly



carried out by IDF soldiers in the camp, in which framework 500-600 innocent civilians were killed, in practice, according to IDF reports (correct for 16 April), 46 bodies were found in the refugee camps, 44 bodies of gunmen/fighters and 2 bodies of civilians).

7. It is important to emphasize that the terror activists who transformed the refugee camp into their "fortress" made cynical use of the local civilian population:

- a. They operated from inside populated houses, knowing that this would restrict the IDF reaction and with the hidden hope that severe casualties to civilians will damage Israel's image and lead to international pressure on it. (according to a press report, there were 1,500 civilians in Jenin refugee camp during the fighting and they did not leave the camp.
- b. They activated explosive charges whose detonation caused the destruction of homes and property of civilians. Thabet Mardawi, a senior PIJ activist from Jenin, admitted during his interrogation that during the battle with IDF soldiers in Jenin refugee camp, he exploded gas cylinders which destroyed homes in which civilians lived.

#### **Characteristics of the Terror Infrastructure in Jenin and its Refugee Camp According to Captured Documents**

8. The captured documents unveil the extensive scope of the terror infrastructures of the various organizations and the terrorist attacks originating from the Jenin area, and principally from Jenin refugee camp. Below are the main characteristics of this terror infrastructure according to captured documents examined so far:

- a. The depth of the human terror infrastructure in Jenin. In a Fatah report from Jenin refugee camp addressed to Marwan Barghouti, it is written that from all the districts, Jenin district is "overflowing with fighters of tremendous quality and quantity" who belong to Fatah and the other national and Islamic movements. The report states that Israel defines Jenin as a "hornet's nest" and this name is indeed correct since there are many youths in Jenin who are willing to sacrifice themselves, and therefore Jenin has been called the "Suicides Capital" (and indeed many suicide and killing attacks which resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israelis and the wounding of hundreds were "exported" to Israel by the terror infrastructure in Jenin).
- b. The mention of terrorist attacks, including killing and suicide attacks which were directed and perpetrated by the terror infrastructure in Jenin in order to weaken Israel. The captured documents mention attacks carried out against soldiers and civilians which originated in Jenin and the names of the organizations and terrorists who planned them. For example:
  - 1) Thabet Azmi Mardawi, a senior activist in the PIJ military arm, of whom it is written that he "participated in the preparation of a few suicide acts" (Mardawi is now under arrest in Israel. He is responsible for a large number of terrorist attacks, including suicide attacks inside Israel such as the suicide attack in Binyamina [16 July 2001] and the bus explosion in Wadi Ara [20 March 2002]).
  - 2) Ali Suleyman Al-Safuri, a senior activist in the PIJ military arm, of whom it is written that he "has a prominent role in the preparation of explosive belts and charges" (Al-Safuri is under arrest in Israel. He is responsible, amongst other things, for the suicide attacks in Binyamina

3) Muhammad Salah Salim Yassin, a senior activist in the PIJ military arm, of whom it is written that he "participated in the perpetration of a few suicide acts" (Yassin was killed by the IDF on 7 March 2002 and was indeed involved in killing attacks inside Israel).

4) Wa'el Ahmad Jalamnah from the PIJ (he is known to have driven his partner to the suicide attack in "Paris Square" in Haifa [26 February 2002] and succeeded in escaping to Jenin refugee camp). According to a captured document, the two activists departed from Jenin refugee camp. According to the document, Jalamnah succeeded in fleeing to Jenin (after the attack in Haifa was foiled and his partner was arrested).

5) A captured document mentions the "murder of a settler" and wounding of 20 others during activity of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades originating from Jenin.

6) A captured document mentions the implementation of the "Umm el Fahm act" in "Israel's depth" which was perpetrated by the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (the intention is to the firing carried out on 28 April 2001 at a car in Umm Al Fahm. An Israeli civilian was killed in the attack and another was wounded).

7) An additional captured document mentions a suicide attack in Afula in which PA intelligence apparatus activists from Jenin were involved together with the PIJ (the intention is to the killing attack in Afula on 27 November 2001 perpetrated by the PIJ and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades).

- c. The existence of a strong terror infrastructure which was built by the PIJ and Hamas, which depends, amongst other things, on intensive use of its financial resources. According to the documents, the large amounts of money flowing to Jenin from Damascus (see below) enable PIJ and Hamas to recruit to their ranks youths with motivation, provide them with a monthly salary and solve their financial problems (while posing a challenge to Fatah which does not have such large financial resources and whose members, as reported in one document, receive financial aid from PIJ). The strength of their financial sources enabled these organizations, inter alia, to penetrate the ranks of the Palestinian intelligence apparatuses, bribe senior commanders of apparatuses in the Jenin area and receive assistance from them in operational activity and in protection against expected PA moves.
- d. The existence in Jenin of a terror infrastructure of the Fatah and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades/Tanzim which is in contact with Marwan Barghouti, who provides them with money and budgets, and which competes with PIJ and Hamas. A captured document states that Jenin "refugee camp" is considered to be a Fatah "fortress" in the (Jenin) district and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the camp are those "who consolidated Fatah's presence and operational capabilities". According to a captured document from May 2001, there are 63 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades fighters in the Jenin district divided into four military units (it is assumed that their number has since risen). Their activity, it is written "focuses on the weakening of the Israeli enemy" and the defense of the refugee camp (in cooperation with other elements). The main constraint which blocked their progress (at least in the first half of 2001) was the financial constraint, and the Fatah activists in Jenin expected Marwan Barghouti to assist them in overcoming this problem.
- e. Trans-organizational operational cooperation expressed by joint terrorist attacks in Israel and joint preparations to defend Jenin. There are a few expressions of this cooperation in the captured documents:



1) The existence of joint frameworks for all the terrorist organizations. The documents mention the "combined force" which apparently operates in the context of a defense plan for Jenin and whose men belong to all the organizations operating there (it is possible that the units operating in this framework are called "guard units". One document mentions a joint operations room in Jenin.

2) The existence of inter-organizational operational cooperation in the perpetration of terrorist attacks inside Israel. One document notes that the commander of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the Jenin area recruited one of the terrorists who took part in the suicide attack in Afula (on 27 November 2001 in which 2 Israeli civilians were killed and approx. 50 wounded). The responsibility for this attack was indeed jointly claimed by the PIJ and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. We are familiar with additional cases of inter-organizational cooperation (Fatah and PIJ) in perpetration of terrorist attacks inside Israel which originated in the Jenin area (see following section).

3) Cooperation in various realms between Fatah and local PA intelligence apparatuses and the PIJ and Hamas. This is expressed not only in joint terrorist attacks but also in warnings of expected activities by the PA which were transferred to the PIJ by the Deputy Chief of the Preventive Security Directorate in Jenin; in early reporting of expected arrests and names of wanted persons by the PA, in the procurement of arms by Preventive Security officers for the PIJ and Hamas in the Jenin area. One captured document states that the Deputy Head of the Preventive Security Directorate supplied Hamas and PIJ with weapons from "the arms depot in northern Palestine whose contents were stolen" (the intention is to the arms stolen from Kibbutz Manara, some of which, according to a press report was found by the IDF in Jenin).

- f. The direction of the PIJ terror infrastructure in the Jenin area by the organization's headquarters in Damascus. In this framework, one document states that Dr. Ramadan Shalakh, the PIJ secretary, transfers large sums of money to PIJ activists in Jenin, for financial aid to the families of martyrs and also for payment of expenses for suicide and killing attacks. According to this document, he transferred a large sum of money for the suicide and killing attacks in Afula (27 November 2001), whose "sundry expenses" was a sum of \$31,000. In addition, a sum of \$127,000 is mentioned as aid to support the families of martyrs and activists under arrest (these sums of money also constituted a source for corruption and internal strife amongst PIJ members in Jenin).
- g. One captured document indicates ties between senior activists in the Jenin terror infrastructure and Israeli Arabs, while exploiting the fact that the refugees living in the Jenin area originate from the Galilee. The document notes that Bassam Ragheb Al Sa'adi, a senior PIJ activist in Jenin who deals in money transfers, conducts "extensive ties with people inside the green line (areas)". (Bassam Sa'adi is known to be a PIJ senior activist in Jenin who is responsible for the perpetration of a few bomb attacks inside Israel including in Hadera (25 May 2001) and Netanya (30 January 2001).

#### **Major Attacks Carried out by the Terrorist Infrastructure in Jenin**

##### **Hamas**

1. 9 September 2001 - A suicide attack in Nahariya, 3 Israelis killed and 48 wounded, the attacker was an Israeli Arab from the Galilee.

2. 19 March 2002 - A shooting attack in Hamam Al Maliach (Jordan Valley), an IDF officer was killed and 3 Israelis were wounded.

3. 31 March 2002 - Suicide attack in Haifa, leaving 15 Israeli civilians dead and 33 wounded. The attacker was from Jenin refugee camp, and had an Israeli ID card.

#### **PIJ**

1. 16 July 2001 - A suicide attack at the Binyamina railway station killing 2 Israelis and wounding 10.

2. 28 October 2001 -. A shooting attack in Hadera killing 4 Israelis and wounding 42.

3. 29 November 2001 - A suicide attack at a junction near an army base near Pardes Hanna killing 3 Israelis and wounding 9.

4. 25 January 2002 - A suicide attack at the old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv leaving 23 wounded (in cooperation with Fatah).

5. 5 January 2002 - A suicide attack in Afula, killing one Israeli and wounding 15.

6. 20 March 2002 - A suicide attack in a bus in Wadi Ara, killing 7 Israelis and wounding 28.

7. 10 April 2002 - A suicide attack at the Yagur junction, killing 8 Israelis and wounding 20.

#### **Fatah**

1. 1 February 2001 - The murder of Lior Ataya.

2. 28 April 2001 - Shooting at a car near Umm al Fahm, killing one Israeli civilian and wounding another (female).

3. 1-3 May 2001 - Test firing of mortar bombs produced by Fatah activists.

4. 28 June 2001 - Shooting at a vehicle near Ganim, one woman was killed.

5. 8 August 2001 - The laying of a charge at Golani Junction, there were no casualties.

6. 11 September 2001 - Shooting at "Bezek" workers near Shaked and detonation of a charge at an IDF force that was carrying out searches in the area. An Israeli civilian and 4 soldiers were wounded.

7. 4 October 2001 - A terrorist disguised as a soldier fired at Israeli civilians in the central bus station in Afula. 3 civilians were killed and 14 wounded.

8. 27 October 2001 - Infiltration to the settlement of Me Ammi and laying of a charge there. There were no casualties.

9. 9 November 2001 - Shooting at an Israeli vehicle near Yabed. An Israeli civilian woman was killed.

10. 27 November 2001 - A joint PIJ and Fatah suicide attack, in which terrorists fired at civilians in the Afula central bus station. 2 Israeli civilians



